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As a candidate, Barack Obama promised ((a neHJ era 
of openness," and his administration has taken some 
significant steps to increase transparency in the executive 
branch. But it has also continued the Bush 
administration's policy of invoking the state secrets 
privilege to avoid judicial scrutiny of controversial 
warrantless surveillance and torture programs. Many 
commentators have noted the parallels between the Bush 
and Obama policies on disclosing sensitive information 
to courts, but they have paid little attention to whether the 
Obama administration has continued Bush 
administration policies regarding the disclosure of 
sensitive information to Congress. 
This Essay fills that gap, and looks in detail at the Bush 
and Obama Administration responses to legislative 
proposals for expanding intelligence disclosures to 
Congress. It reviews the Bush and Obama 
Administration positions on legislation that would 
require intelligence disclosure to Congress, and finds that 
there are substantial similarities- though not identity­
between the Bush and Obama Administration 
approaches. Both Administrations have opposed 
disclosure of covert actions to the full intelligence 
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committees and the disclosure of internal executive 
branch legal advice. On these most sensitive intelligence 
issues, we will see increased disclosure to Congress only 
over the objection of President Barack Obama. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Obama Administration came into office with great 
expectations for increased transparency. As a candidate, Barack 
Obama promised "a new era of openness," pledging that he 
would "restore the balance we've lost between the necessarily 
secret and the necessity of openness in a democratic society."1 
On his first full day in office, he issued memoranda proclaiming 
that his "Administration is committed to creating an 
unprecedented level of openness in Government,"2 directing the 
Attorney General to issue new guidelines to agency heads about 
the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), "reaffirming the 
commitment to accountability and transparency,"3 and an 
executive order on presidential records, reversing the George W. 
Bush executive order that permitted the heirs of deceased 
former Presidents to invoke constitutional privileges and prevent 
disclosure.4 Since then, Attorney General Eric Holder issued a 
memorandum reversing John Ashcroft's 2001 FOIA 
memorandum, and indicating that the Justice Department would 
defend nondisclosure only if disclosure will harm "an interest 
protected by one of the statutory exemptions . . . or [if] 
disclosure is prohibited by law."5 The Justice Department 
released long-sought legal memoranda about the CIA's torture 
program,6 and the Office of Management and Budget directed 
1. Senator Barack Obama, Remarks on Fifth Anniversary of Speech Opposing the 
Iraq War (Oct. 2, 2007), available at http://www.barackobama.com/2007/10/02/on_fifth_ 
anniversary _of_speech.php. 
2. Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 2009 DAILY COMP. 
PRES. Doc. 10 (Jan. 21,  2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/ 
DCPD200900010.pdf. 
3. Memorandum on the Freedom of Information Act, 2009 DAILY COMP PRES. 
Doc. 9 (Jan. 21,  2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/ 
DCPD200900009. pdf. 
4. Exec. Order No. 13 ,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4669 (Jan. 21, 2009); Exec. Order No. 
13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 1, 2001). 
5. Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. to Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies 2 (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/ag_ 
foia_memo2009-03-19.pdf. The Ashcroft memorandum pledged to defend all decisions 
not to disclose "unless they lack a sound legal basis." Memorandum from Attorney Gen. 
John Ashcroft to Heads of All Federal Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001),  
available at  http://www.justice.gov/archive/oip/011012.htm. 
6. See Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Memos Spell Out Brutal CI.A. Mode of 
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executive branch agencies to make high value data sets freely 
available on the web.7 
But the Obama Administration has disappointed open 
government advocates by opposing efforts to hold accountable 
those involved in several controversial Bush Administration 
intelligence programs: warrantless surveillance, torture and 
extraordinary rendition. President Obama personally opposes a 
proposed truth commission to investigate the interrogation and 
warrantless surveillance programs, 8 preferring to look forward 
rather than backward.9 Obama personally intervened and 
reversed a Justice Department decision to abide by an appellate 
court decision that the FOIA requires the government to release 
photographs of U.S. military personnel abusing prisoners in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.10 Instead, the executive branch sought 
Supreme Court review of that decision, and while the case was 
pending, convinced Congress to revise FOIA in order to avoid 
disclosure. 11 
In a move that has received much attention in the press and 
blogosphere, the Obama Administration has favored secrecy 
over transparency to avoid judicial scrutiny of the Bush 
Administration's warrantless surveillance and torture policies.12 
Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2009/04/17 /us/politics/17 detain.html. 
7. See, e.g., Data.gov, www.data.gov/about (last visited Aug. 14, 2010) ("The 
purpose of Data.gov is to increase public access to high value, machine readable datasets 
generated by the Executive Branch of the Federal Government."); USAspending.gov, 
www.usaspending.gov (last visited Aug. 14, 2010) (providing information about 
government contracts). 
8. President's Remarks at the National Archives and Records Administration, 
2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 388 (May 21, 2009), available at http://www. 
gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900388.pdf. 
9. David Johnston Charlie Savage, Obama Signals His Reluctance To Investigate 
Bush Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, at Al, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/0l/12/us/politics/12inquire.html (quoting then-President­
elect Obama as stating that "we need to look forward as opposed to looking 
backwards").  
10. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't. of Def., 543 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated, 
130 S. Ct. 777 (2009); Jeff Zeleny & Thom Shankar, Obama Reversal on Abuse Photos, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/ 
l 4/us/politics/l 4photos.html. 
11 .  Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
1 11-83, § 565, 123 Stat. 2142 (2009) (amending FOIA by granting the Secretary of 
Defense the discretion to withhold the release of photographs of prisoners being 
abused). In light of this Act, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court decision. 
Dep't of Def. v. ACLU, 130 S. Ct. 777 (2009). 
12. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Obama Backs Off a Reversal on Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 10, 2009, at Al2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/world/americas/ 
lOiht-lOtorture.20065435.html; Glenn Greenwald, Op-Ed., The 180-Degree Reversal of 
Obama's State Secrets Position, SALON.COM, Feb. 10, 2009, http://www.salon.com/ 
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Although the Administration instituted new internal executive 
branch procedures for invoking the state secrets privilege, it has 
not changed the executive branch's stance in court. In lawsuit 
after lawsuit seeking redress for the Bush Administration's 
warrantless surveillance and torture policies, the Obama 
Administration has argued that the state secrets doctrine 
requires courts to dismiss these cases, using the same arguments 
(and even nearly identical affidavits) as the Bush 
Administration.13 On the question of whether courts can serve as 
an accountability mechanism for controversial intelligence 
policies, there is little difference between the positions of the 
Obama and George W. Bush Administrations.14 
While the parallels between the Bush and Obama policies 
regarding the disclosure of sensitive information to courts has 
received a great deal of attention, less attention has been given 
to how the Obama Administration compares with the Bush 
Administration in disclosing sensitive information to Congress. 
This Essay examines the Obama and Bush Administration 
policies toward disclosing intelligence-related information to 
C 15 ongress. 
To make such a comparison, one would ideally compare the 
quantity and quality of intelligence information that each 
Administration actually disclosed to Congress. But when the 
executive branch discloses this information to Congress, it 
generally provides it only to the intelligence committees in 
secret, and the committees keep that information secret.16 The 
lack of publicly available data about the actual information 
disclosed to Congress makes it impossible to perform that kind 
of comparison. 
opinion/greenwald/2009/02/10/obama/. 
13. Schwartz, supra note 12. 
14. For a discussion of various accountability mechanisms, see Kathleen Clark, The 
Architecture of Accountability: The Case of Warrantless Surveillance, 2010 BYU L. REV. 
(forthcoming). 
15. Confidential disclosure of information to congressional intelligence committees 
does not, of course, constitute "openness." Yet widening the circle of disclosure, even 
within government, may help achieve accountability through the checking function of 
elected representatives, if not through the involvement of the public, at large. 
Conversely, restricting disclosures, even within government, can and does hinder 
accountability. The facially inadequate Justice Department legal memoranda justifying 
torture and warrantless surveillance could remain viable only through tightly limiting 
their distribution, even within government. See Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by 
the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 455, 462 (2005) 
[hereinafter Clark, Ethical Issues]; Clark, supra note 14. 
16. See L. BRITT SNIDER, THE AGENCY AND THE HILL: CIA'S RELATIONSHIP 
WITH CONGRESS, 1946-2004, at 1 15 (2008). 
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What is publicly available, however, is information about 
the Bush and Obama Administrations' positions on proposed 
legislation that would require increased intelligence disclosure to 
Congress. In every year since the New York Times's December 
2005 revelation that the Bush Administration had engaged in 
warrantless surveillance,17 members of Congress have introduced 
legislation to increase intelligence disclosures to Congress, and 
the executive branch has expressed a position on that legislation. 
By looking in detail at those proposed legislative measures and 
the executive branch's positions on them, it becomes apparent 
that the Obama Administration has, to a significant degree, 
continued the Bush Administration secrecy regime. 
II. DISCLOSING INTELLIGENCE TO CONGRESS 
Up until the mid-1970s, the executive branch disclosed to 
Congress little information about intelligence operations, and 
Congress performed little oversight of the intelligence agencies.18 
In 1975, the Senate and House convened ad hoc investigatory 
committees to examine intelligence abuses.19 Those committees 
held extensive hearings and wrote reports about the intelligence 
agencies.20 As a result of those ad hoc investigations, both 
Chambers established permanent committees tasked with 
intelligence oversight.21 In 1980, Congress passed legislation 
requiring the executive branch to keep the congressional 
intelligence committees "fully and currently informed" of 
intelligence activities.22 
17. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al. 
18. FRANK J. SMIST, JR., CONGRESS OVERSEES THE UNITED STATES 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, 1947-1994 (2d ed. 1994); SNIDER, supra note 16, at 94-103; 
LOCH K. JOHNSON, SEASON QF INQUIRY: THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION 
(1985). 
19. The Senate created a Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 
with Respect to Intelligence Activities and the House Select Intelligence Committee. In 
February 1975, the House created a committee chaired by Rep. Lucien Nedzi, but that 
committee was beset with problems. In July 1975, the House disbanded that committee 
and created a new committee chaired by Rep. Otis Pike. CECIL V. CRABB & PAT M. 
HOLT, INVITATION TO STRUGGLE: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT & FOREIGN POLICY 
172-75 (2d ed. 1984). 
20. Id. 
21. The Senate created the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 1976. S. Res. 
400, 94th Cong., 94 CONG. REC. 4754 (1976) . The House created the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence in 1977. H. Res. 658, 95th Cong., 95 CONG. REC. 22,932 
(1977). 
22. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 407, 
94 Stat. 1975, 1981 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 413 (2006)). 
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Congress enacted a special-more limited-notification 
process for covert actions (defined as government activities 
intended "to influence political, economic, or military conditions 
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States 
Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly"23). 
For covert actions, Congress permitted prior notice to be limited 
to just eight members of Congress (rather than the full 
intelligence committees) where "the President determines it is 
essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinar� 
circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States." 4 
This small subset of legislators 1s referred to as the "gang of 
eight:" the chairs and ranking members25 of the intelligence 
committees, the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of 
Representatives, and the Majority and Minority Leaders of the 
Senate.26 Since 1980, Presidents have used this "gang of eight" 
procedure to notify Congress of covert actions.21 
While the statutory "gang of eight" procedure applies only 
to covert actions (as opposed to other intelligence activities, such 
as intelligence collection), the George W. Bush Administration 
23. Congress enacted this statutory definition of "covert action" in 1991. 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. 102-88, § 503( e ) ,  105 Stat. 
429, 442 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2006)). The statutory definition of 
"covert activities" specifically excludes "activities the primary purpose of which is to 
acquire intelligence." Id. 
24. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-450 
§ 50l(a)(l)(B),  94 Stat. 1975, 1981 (1980) . The Act does not explicitly require the 
executive branch to provide the intelligence committees with prior notification of covert 
actions, but refers to covert actions as "significant anticipated intelligence activity," id. § 
501(a)(1) (emphasis added), and the Act's two mentions of "prior notice" seem to 
assume that prior notice is generally required, id. See also S. REP. No. 96-730, at 4 (1980) , 
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4192, 4194 (noting that the legislation repeals the 
Hughes-Ryan Amendment's requirement that the executive branch report covert actions 
to Congress "in a timely fashion," and asserting that it replaced that provision with a 
requirement that the intelligence committees be given prior notice of covert actions); 
SNIDER, supra note 16, at 59-60 (noting that the legislation "contemplated [that the 
intelligence committees] would be advised in advance" of covert actions). 
25. On the Senate Intelligence Committee, the ranking member (i.e., minority 
member with the most seniority) serves as Vice-Chair of the Committee. S. Res. 400, 
94th Cong., 94 CONG. REC. 4754 (1976). 
26. Alfred Cumming, Cong. Research Serv., "Gang of Four" Congressional 
Intelligence Notifications (2010), available at http:// assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40698_ 
20100129.pdf. 
27. But see HOUSE SELECT COMM. To INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS 
TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN & SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION, REPORT OF THE 
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN/CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. 
No. 433, S. REP. No. 216, at 4-5 (1987). (President Reagan failed to notify even the "gang 
of eight" of the covert action to sell arms to Iran, and Congress learned of the sale only 
after it was revealed in a Lebanese newspaper). 
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used the "gang of eight" procedure to inform Congress of its 
warrantless surveillance and torture programs.28 After the 
program was disclosed in the New York Times, some members 
of the intelligence committees who had not been part of the 
"gang of eight" expressed anger that they had not been 
informed.29 Democratic members of the "gang of eight" were put 
on the defensive for not having done more to oppose the 
program, but protested that secrecr prevented them from taking 
any action to oppose the program.3 
Of particular concern was whether the surveillance program 
was even legal. Prior to disclosure of the program in the New 
York Times, at least one member of the "gang of eight" privately 
expressed concern about its legality.31 After its disclosure, several 
congressional committees sought-but were denied-access to 
the Justice Department memoranda that provided the legal 
justification for the program.32 
In response to these controversial Bush Administration 
intelligence policies and its practice of notifying only the "gang 
of eight," some members of Congress proposed legislation to 
ensure broader intelligence disclosure to the intelligence 
committees. In each of the four years following the New York 
Times disclosure of the surveillance program, members of 
Congress introduced intelligence authorization bills that would 
have increased intelligence disclosure to Congress. The next 
28. Pamela Hess, Michael Hayden: Congress Was Informed About Surveillance 
Program, BUFFINGTON POST, July 11, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2009/07/ll/michael-hayden-congress-w_n_230066.html; Cumming, supra note 26. 
29. Sen. Russell Feingold introduced a resolution to censure President Bush for 
"his failure to inform the full congressional intelligence committees as required by law." 
S. Res. 398, 109th Cong., 109 CONG. REC. S2041 (2006). 
30. Nancy Pelosi, Op-Ed., The Gap in Intelligence Oversight, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 
2006, at B7 (defending her failure to object to warrantless surveillance); Glenn Thrush & 
John Bresnahan, Pelosi Defense: Couldn't Object in '03, POLITICO, May 11, 2009, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0509/22401.html (providing Pelosi's defense for her 
failure to object to torture); Rep. Jane Harmon, Jane Harman Comments on the Release 
of Bush's Law by Eric Lichtblau, TPM, Mar. 31, 2008, 
http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2008/03/31/j ane _harman_ comments_ on_the _re/; 
Shane Harris, The CIA Briefing Game, NAT'L. J., June 6, 2009, 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nj_20090606_ 4885.php. 
31. Letter from Senator Jay Rockefeller, Vice Chairman, Senate Select 
Comm. on Intelligence , to Vice President Cheney (July 17 , 2003) ,  available at 
http://www. glo balsecuri ty .org/in tell/library /news/2005/in tell-051219-rockefellerOl 
.pdf. 
32. See, e.g. , Letter from Representative John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, to Fred Fielding, Counsel to the President, Office of the 
Counsel to the President (Feb. 12, 2008), available at http://www. 
themediaconsortium.com/reporting/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/conyers080212.pdf 
(seeking access to legal memoranda relating to the warrantless surveillance program). 
r 
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Section identifies the intelligence disclosure provisions of the 
intelligence authorization bills for fiscal years ("FY") 2007 to 
2010, and examines the Bush and Obama Administration 
positions on those provisions. 
To make this comparison, I reviewed the official Bush and 
Obama Administration positions on the intelligence 
authorization bills from FY 2007 to 2010,33 identified executive 
branch objections to requirements for intelligence disclosure to 
Congress, determined whether that provision had been proposed 
during both the Bush Administration (FY 2007, 2008 or 2009) 
and the Obama Administration (FY 2010),34 and then examined 
33. E.g. , OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 2701-INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION 
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 (July 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? pid=86389 [hereinafter FY 2010 SAP]. 
This approach-examining Statements of Administration Policy and veto messages 
regarding intelligence authorization bills-is under-inclusive in two ways. First, it does 
not reach intelligence-related provisions that were included in other legislation, but not 
the intelligence authorization bills. See, e.g . ,  S. Res. 3501 ,  110th Cong., 110 CONG. REC. 
S8861 (2008) (requiring the executive branch to report to Congress if it issues an opinion 
indicating that a statute does not constrain executive branch action). Second, it does not 
reach other communications of administration position, such as official testimony or 
informal statements regarding pending legislation. See, e.g., Letter from Michael 
Mukasey, Attorney Gen., to Senator Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Nov. 14, 
2008), available athttp://www. justice.gov/olc/2008/olc-reporting-act.pdf. 
34. Information disclosure provisions that appeared during only the Bush 
Administration or only the Obama Administration could not become the basis for 
comparison between the two Administrations. Examples of provisions that were 
proposed during either the Bush or Obama Administrations, but not both, include 
provisions that would: 
• require a report to Congress on "intelligence activities related to the overthrow 
of a democratically elected government" in the previous ten years, Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2082, 1 10th Cong. § 503 (2007); 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 2082 - INTELLIGENCE 
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 (2007), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2007/12/sap121 107.pdf [hereinafter FY 2008 SAP]; 
• allow the disclosure of non-covert action-related information to the full 
committees if the Chair and ranking member agree, Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2009, H.R. 5959, 110th Cong. § 502 (2008); OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 5959 - INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT 
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 (2008), available at 
http://www. presidency. ucsb .edu/ws/index. php ?pid= 77 656 [hereinafter FY 2009 
SAP]; 
require that each member of the intelligence committees be notified of the fact 
that only the Chair and ranking member were given full information regarding 
non-covert action-related information, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2007, s. 372, 1 10th Cong. § 304 (2007); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION 
POLICY: S. 372 - INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF FY 2007 (2007) ,  
available a t  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25593&st= 
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whether the Bush and Obama Administrations took the same 
position on the intelligence disclosure provisions that had been 
proposed during both Administrations. While none of these 
provisions has been enacted into law,35 the debate over them lays 
bare the executive branch's position on intelligence disclosures 
to Congress, and shows substantial similarities- though not 
identity- between the Bush and Obama positions. 
III. PROPOSALS FOR INCREASED INTELLIGENCE 
DISCLOSURE 
Each of the intelligence authorization bills from FY 2007 to 
2010 includes provisions for increased intelligence disclosure to 
Congress. There were repeated attempts to require disclosure of 
legal advice related to intelligence activities and disclosure of 
covert actions beyond the chair and ranking members of the 
intelligence committees.36 
A. DISCLOSURE OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEGAL OPINIONS 
Perhaps due to the controversy surrounding the Bush 
Administration's legal memoranda supporting torture,37 in every 
year since 2005, Congress included in its intelligence 
authorization bills provisions requiring the executive branch to 
disclose its legal opinions to Congress.38 The Bush and Obama 
Administrations consistently opposed these provisions. 
&stl= [hereinafter FY 2007 SAP]; 
• require disclosure of intelligence information to the Government 
Accountability Office, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, 
H.R. 2701, l ll th Cong. § 335 (2009); FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33. 
See infra Appendix B. 
35. The last intelligence authorization bill to become law was for FY 2005. See 
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-487, 118 Stat. 3939 (2004). 
Congress passed an intelligence authorization bill for FY 2008, but President Bush 
vetoed the bill. INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008-VETO 
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. Doc. No. 110-100), 154 
CONG. REC. Hl419-20 (2008). 
36. For a summary of the information disclosure provisions and the Bush and 
Obama Administrations' positions on these provisions, see infra Appendix A. 
37. The Bush Administration's August 1, 2002 legal opinion was leaked in The 
Washington Post in June 2004. David Ignatius, Op-Ed., Small Com.fort, WASH. POST, 
June 15, 2004, at A23. For a discussion of the ensuing ethical controversies, see Clark, 
Ethical Issues, supra note 15. 
38. A review of the intelligence authorization bills from FY 2001 to FY 2010 
indicates that the requirement to disclose legal opinions appeared for the first time in 
2005 (the year after revelation of the torture opinion) in the FY 2006 bill. Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, S. 1803, 109th Cong. § 107 (2005). This same 
provision reappeared in identical form in the FY 2007 bill. S. 372, § 108. 
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A provision in the FY 2007 intelligence authorization bill 
would have required disclosure of intelligence-related legal 
opinions to Congress, but permitted the executive branch to 
avoid disclosure, as long as the President asserted a 
constitutional privilege.39 This provision was rather modest, 
permitting nondisclosure upon mere invocation of a 
constitutional privilege (rather than adjudication of its 
applicability). But the Bush Administration opposed it, arguing 
that it "would foster political gamesmanship and elevate routine 
disagreements to the level of constitutional crises. "40 
Another provision, requiring disclosure to Congress of legal 
advice regarding the meaning of the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005, as applied to interrogation techniques, was narrower in 
scope, but did not include an automatic exception upon 
invocation of a privilege.41 The Bush Administration opposed 
this disclosure requirement, contending that it "rais[ es] grave 
constitutional issues."42 President Bush referred to this provision 
when he vetoed the FY 2008 intelligence authorization bill, 
contending that "questions concerning access to such 
information are best addressed through the customary practices 
and arrangements between the executive and legislative 
branches on such matters, rather than through the enactment of 
legislation. "43 
39. S. 372, § 508 (requiring the disclosure of information "unless the President 
certifies that such document or information is not being provided because the President 
is asserting a privilege pursuant to the Constitution of the United States").  While the bill 
did not define "privilege pursuant to the Constitution," it presumably would include the 
state secrets privilege. 
40. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34. 
41.  Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2082, 110th Cong. 
§ 326 (2007); S.  372, § 313. The FY 2008 bill also required disclosure of legal advice 
related to the meaning of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, as applied to 
interrogation techniques. H.R. 2082, § 326. 
42. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 2. 
43. INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008-VETO 
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. Doc. No. 110-100), 154 
CONG. REC. H1419, 1420 (2008); see also FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34. The Statement of 
Administration Policy ("SAP") for FY 2007 made a similar policy argument regarding 
this provision: that this is a "matter[] . . .  appropriately left to sensitive handling in the 
normal course between the intelligence committees and the executive branch and should 
not be the subject of detailed statutory reporting requirements."  FY 2007 SAP, supra 
note 34. 
The Obama Administration has not been faced with this particular legislative 
proposal, and so it is not clear what its position on it would be. On the one hand, in April 
2009, the Obama Administration released to the public several Bush Administration 
legal opinions regarding interrogation techniques. See Mazzetti & Shane, supra note 6. 
(These released opinions would not have been covered by the FY 2007 and FY 2008 bills 
because they were issued before enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.) On 
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A broader provision, requiring the disclosure to Congress of 
information about the legal status of intelligence and operations, 
including dissenting views, appeared in the FY 2009 and FY 2010 
bills.44 Both the Bush and Obama Administrations opposed this 
provision,45 and the Obama Administration even issued a veto 
threat based on this disclosure requirement.46 While the Obama 
Administration has been willing to disclose some of the 
controversial Bush Administration legal opinions justifying 
torture,47 it, like the Bush Administration before it, has chafed at 
the prospect of a statutory requirement to disclose its legal 
opinions. 
B. DISCLOSURE OF COVERT ACTIONS BEYOND THE 
"GANG OF EIGHT" 
The Bush and Obama Administrations also both opposed 
disclosure of covert actions to the full intelligence committees. 
The FY 2007 bill required the executive branch to notify the full 
intelligence committees of covert actions, or at least notify the 
full committees of the fact that they were not being fully 
informed and why.48 That bill would also withhold all funding for 
any intelligence activity (including covert actions) on which the 
executive branch had not followed that mandate.49 The Bush 
Administration objected to these provisions, noting that they 
"may require broader dissemination of the very facts that 
require limited access."50 The Administration also contended 
the other hand, the Obama Administration opposes legislation that would require the 
disclosure of information about the legal status of intelligence collection operations and 
covert actions, including dissenting views. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2010, H.R. 2701, l l lth,Cong. § 321 (2009). 
44. H.R. 2701 , § 321; Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, H.R. 
5959, l lOth Cong. § 502 (2008). 
45. The Bush Administration indicated that this provision "would undermine long­
standing arrangements between Congress and the President regarding reporting of 
sensitive intelligence matters." FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2. The Obama 
Administration also opposed this provision. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 1 ("[This 
provision] raises serious constitutional concerns by amending sections 501-503 of the 
National Security Act of 1947 in ways that would raise significant executive privilege 
concerns by purporting to require the disclosure of internal Executive branch legal 
advice and deliberations. Administrations of both political parties have long recognized 
the importance of protecting the confidentiality of the Executive Branch's legal advice 
and deliberations."). 
46. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 1. 
47. See Mazzetti & Shane, supra note 6. 
48. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, S. 372, l lOth Cong. § 304 
(2007). 
49. Id. § 307. 
50. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 2. 
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that this "all-or-nothing approach to executive branch 
notification to the intelligence committees . . .  would 
discourage, rather than encourage, the sharing of 
extraordinarily sensitive information. ,, si 
The FY 2009 intelligence authorization bill did not directly 
require such disclosure, but used Congress's control over 
appropriations as a lever to pressure the executive branch to 
make such disclosure. It would have withheld funding of 75% of 
the intelligence budget until covert actions are reported to the 
full intelligence committees. s2 The Bush Administration opposed 
this provision, arguing that it 
would undermine the fundamental compact between the 
Congress and the President on reporting highly sensitive 
intelligence matters- an arrangement that for decades has 
balanced congressional oversight responsibility with the need 
to protect intelligence information. Questions concerning 
access to such information are best addressed through the 
customary practices and arrangements, rather than through 
enactment of contradictory legislation.s3 
The FY 2010 bill would delete the statutory "gang of eight" 
notification procedure for covert actions, and create a default 
rule that the President must notify the full intelligence 
committees of covert actions. s4 Narrower notification would be 
permitted only if the intelligence committees establish written 
procedures indicating that not all members of the committees 
must be notified. ss This new default position would have the 
effect of transferring power that is now in the hands of the 
intelligence committee chairs and ranking members over to the 
full committee membership, who for decades have been 
excluded from information about covert actions (and, during the 
Bush Administration, were excluded from information about 
questionable intelligence policies). Only if the full committee 
establishes a new written rule for more limited disclosure would 
the full committee be excluded from notifications of covert 
actions. The Obama Administration opposes this new default 
rule for covert action notification, threatening a veto of a bill 
51. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 2. 
52. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, H.R. 5959, 1 10th Cong. 
§ 105 (2008) (proposing to withhold funding for 75% of the National Intelligence 
Program). 
53. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2. 
54. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.R. 2701, l llth Cong. 
§ 321 (2009). 
55. Id. 
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containing it.56 In explaining its opposition, the Obama 
Administration invokes some of the same arguments- and 
language- used by the Bush Administration: the proposed 
changes would undermine what the executive branch refers to as 
a "fundamental compact between the Congress and the 
President" regarding the reporting of intelligence activities, "an 
arrangement that for decades has balanced congressional 
oversight responsibilities with the President's responsibility to 
protect sensitive national security information."57 
C. OTHER DISCLOSURE-RELATED PROVISIONS 
Regarding several other disclosure requirements, the 
Obama Administration position is different from that of the 
Bush Administration. The Bush Administration consistently 
opposed the creation of an Inspector General ("IG") for the 
intelligence community,58 arguing that such a position was 
unnecessary59 and "inconsistent with the preservation of the 
authority of heads of departments and agencies over their 
respective departments and agencies" established in the post-
9/11 intelligence reform legislation.60 The Obama 
Administration's stance on the creation of this new IG is 
ambivalent. While not opposing it as such, the Administration 
indicated that some provisions may need to be changed.61 
The legislative provision that would create a new IG would 
also set out specific procedures for intelligence community 
employees who blow the whistle on wrongdoing.62 As indicated 
56. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 1. 
57. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 1. The FY 2009 SAP similarly contended that a 
provision for disclosure of covert actions to the full committees "would undermine the 
.fundamental compact between the Congress and the President on reporting highly 
sensitive intelligence matters-an arrangement that for decades has balanced 
congressional oversight responsibility with the need to protect intelligence in.formation." 
FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 (emphasis added). 
58. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 1 ("The Administration has consistently 
opposed the creation of an IG/IC in prior bills."). 
59. FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34, at 1 ("The existing inspectors general of the 
departments with elements in the IC, and the Central Intelligence Agency, are best 
suited to perform the necessary investigative, inspection, and audit functions. There is no 
need to spend additional taxpayer resources to provide for two inspectors general with 
competing jurisdiction over the same intelligence elements."). 
60. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34. 
61. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 2 (indicating that the Administration "supports 
the important work undertaken by Inspectors General . . .  and would like to work with 
the Congress on the optimal approach and authorities for carrying out the important 
functions of Inspectors General in the context of the IC") .  
62 .  Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.R. 2701, lllth Cong. 
§ 406 (2009); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, H.R. 5959, llOth Cong. 
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above, the Bush Administration opposed the larger IG 
provision. By implication, the Bush Administration may have 
also opposed this 
. �
hist�eblower provisioi:, but i�s gublic 
statements of oppos1t10n did not focus on wh1stleblowmg. - The 
Obama Administration has taken an explicit-if somewhat 
ambivalent-position on this whistleblower provision. It 
supports the expansion of protections for intelligence 
whistleblowers, but expresses concern that the bill could be 
interpreted "to constrain the President's constitutional authority 
to review and, if appropriate, control disclosure of certain 
classified information."64 The Obama Administration has 
pledged to "work[] closely with Senate and House staff to craft 
appropriate whistleblower enhancement protections for 
intelligence community whistle blowers [so that these provisions] 
address constitutional and other concerns. "65 
The Bush Administration also opposed a requirement that 
the CIA IG audit covert actions every three years and report to 
Congress on his findings. Its objections were two-fold: it "would 
interfere with the independent judgment of the CIA Inspector 
General or Director of the CIA as to what activities should be 
audited and when the audits should be conducted,"66 and 
"conflict[] with the President's authority to control the 
dissemination of classified information."67 When this same 
provision appeared in the FY 2010 bill, the Obama 
Administration did not object to it.68 
Finally, the Bush Administration also objected to a 
requirement that the executive branch report to the intelligence 
committees on "the use of personal service contracts across the 
§ 408 (2008); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2082, l lOth Cong. 
§ 413 (2007); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, S. 372, l lOth Cong. § 
408 (2007). 
63. The FY 2008 SAP expressed opposition to the IG provision, which included 
specific procedures for intelligence whistleblowers. FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34. But its 
stated opposition to this provision did not mention whistleblowing. See FY 2008 SAP, 
supra note 34. 
64. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 2. 
65. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 2. 
66. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2. 
67. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2; see also FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34 (same 
objection). The Bush Administration also indicated that the disclosure requirement 
conflicts with other statutory provisions allowing the CIA Director to prevent disclosures 
from the CIA IG to Congress, and runs counter to "long-standing arrangements between 
the Executive and Legislative branches regarding the transmittal of information about 
sensitive intelligence programs." FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2. 
68. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.R. 2701, lllth Cong. 
§ 411 (2009). 
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intelligence community," including a comparison of their 
compensation levels with government employees performing 
similar functions, and their use in covert actions, rendition, 
detention and interrogation.69 The Bush Administration 
contended that this provision would "violate[] long-standing 
arrangements regarding the release of classified information 
concerning highly sensitive national security matters such as 
intelligence collection, analysis, and covert actions. "70 The 
Obama Administration expressed no objection to this contractor 
report requirement in the FY 2010 bill.71 
IV. CONCLUSION 
To a limited degree, the Obama Administration has broken 
from the Bush Administration's practice of opposing nearly all 
requirements to disclose intelligence to Congress. Unlike the 
Bush Administration, the Obama Administration does not 
object to reporting on intelligence contractors, regular audits of 
covert actions, or the creation of an Inspector General for the 
intelligence community. 
But the Obama Administration has continued the Bush 
Administration practice of resisting robust intelligence 
disclosure to Congress. It objects to whistleblower protections 
that "could be understood to constrain the President's 
constitutional authority to . . . control disclosure of certain 
classified information."72 Even more significantly, it opposes 
requirements to disclose legal advice and to disclose covert 
actions beyond the "gang of eight."73 
From a historical perspective, the Obama Administration's 
opposition to these measures is nothing new. For decades, 
Presidents have claimed the right to control classified 
69. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, H.R. 5959, l lOth Cong. 
§ 306 (2008); see also Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2082, 
110th Cong. § 307 (2007) (containing similar language). 
70. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34. The FY 2008 SAP also objected to this provision, 
but only because "there [was] insufficient time to prepare and coordinate the report by 
the . . .  due date." FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34, at 3. 
71. H.R. 2701, § 338; FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33. 
72. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 2. 
73. The Obama Administration has also objected to a new provision that would 
require disclosure to Congress's investigative arm, the Government Accountability 
Office. H.R. 2701, § 335; Letter from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and Budget, 
to Senator Diane Feinstein, Chairwoman, Select Comm. on Intelligence (Mar. 15, 2010), 
available athttp://www. fas.org/irp/news/2010/03/omb031610.pdf [hereinafter Letter from 
Peter R. Orszag]. 
r 
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information and internal legal advice. They have also resisted 
the disclosure of covert actions. In fact, when Congress enacted 
the statutory "gang of eight" procedure in 1980, that provision 
had the effect of narrowing (rather than expanding) the 
disclosure of covert action because the predecessor Hughes­
Ryan Amendment required disclosure of covert actions to eight 
congressional committees, rather than eight members of 
C 7 4 ongress. 
Obama's vehement opposition to disclosing covert actions 
beyond the "gang of eight" -even threatening a veto-is 
particularly troubling because the "gang of eight" procedure 
provides only the appearance- rather than the reality-of a 
congressional check on covert actions. Congress is a collective 
body, and eight members cannot, by themselves, pass any 
legislation to stop or limit particular covert actions. "Gang of 
eight" notification inoculates the executive branch from later 
political backlash because the executive branch can -and does­
point to Congress's inaction as congressional endorsement of the 
covert action. 75 
It is heartening that the Obama Administration has not 
made the same extreme claims of executive secrecy as its 
immediate predecessor. But on two issues that are key to 
retaining executive power-keeping its internal legal advice 
secret and limiting disclosure of covert actions to only eight 
members of Congress- the Obama Administration not only 
expressed opposition, but issued a rare veto threat to a Congress 
controlled by its own party.76 
74. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 32, 88 Stat. 1795, 1804-05 
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1982)) (requiring disclosure of covert actions 
to "the appropriate committees of the Congress," which included the House and Senate 
Intelligence, Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations Committees); see 
William E. Conner, Congressional Reform of Covert Action Oversight Following the Iran­
Contra Affair, 2 DEF. INTELLIGENCE J. 35 , 41 (1993). 
75. Kathleen Clark, Congress's Right To Counsel in Intelligence Oversight, 2011 U. 
ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011);  SNIDER, supra note 16, at 311 (stating that if a covert 
action "is disclosed or ends in disaster, the administration will want to have had Congress 
on board"); see also Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security 
Activities: Improving Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1058-59 (2008). 
76. President Obama has also threatened a veto regarding another provision that is 
aimed at increasing the effectiveness of congressional intelligence oversight: the 
requirement to disclose intelligence information to the Government Accountability 
Office in support of congressional intelligence oversight. H.R. 2701, § 335. The Obama 
Administration objects to this provision, contending that it would "undermine th[e] 
special relationship between the IC [intelligence community] and the congressional 
intelligence committees." Letter from Peter R. Orszag, supra note 73. 
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Candidate Barack Obama's rhetoric led to high 
expectations for a "new era of openness." But his 
Administration's response to proposed intelligence legislation 
tells a different story. We will see increased disclosure to 
Congress on the most sensitive intelligence issues only over the 
objection of President Barack Obama. 
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APPENDIX A 
INTELLIGENCE DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS PROPOSED 
DURING BOTH THE BUSH AND OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATIONS 
FY FY FY FY 
0 2007 2008 2009 2010 t:d cr' Provision :::::: p; H.R. H.R. H.R. [fl 8 S.372 ::::r 2082 5959 2701 p; 
Disclosure of legal advice: 
Disclose legal 
opinions to intelli-
gence committees, or 
any other committee 
with jurisdiction over § 108i N N N 0ii 
the subject matter, 
unless President 
asserts a constitu-
tional privilege. 
Disclose legal advice 
regarding the meaning 
of the Detainee 
Treatment Act of § 313iii § 326iv N N av 
2005, as applied to 
interrogation 
techniques. 
Disclose information 
about the legal status 
of intelligence N N § 502 § 321 ovi ovii 
operations, including 
dissenting views. 
Disclose information 
about the legal status 
of covert actions, N N N § 321 a viii 
including dissenting 
views. 
Covert action disclosures beyond chair & ranking member: 
If full information is 
not given to the full 
committees, then, at § 304 N N N oix least, notify each 
member of that fact & 
why. 
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FY FY FY FY 
0 2007 2008 2009 2010 bj cr' Provision � Pl H.R. H.R. H.R. rJJ i3 S.372 I:;' 2082 5959 2701 Pl 
Deny funding for any 
intelligence activity, 
unless full committees 
have been informed § 307 N N N ox of it, or have, at least, 
been notified that 
they were not 
informed. 
Deny funding for 75% 
of the "National 
Intelligence Program" N N § 105 N oxi until covert actions 
are reported to full 
committees. 
Delete the statutory 
"gang of eight" 
notification for covert 
actions. The President 
can notify less than 
the full committee of 
covert actions only if 
that committee's N N N § 321 oxii written procedures 
indicate that the 
committee 
"determines that not 
all members of that 
committee are 
required to have 
access to a finding." 
Other provisions: 
Create Inspector 
General for the § 408 § 413 § 408 § 406 a xiii xiv intelligence 
community. 
Create specific pro-
cedures for whistle-
blowers who reveal § 408 § 413 § 408 § 406 oxv O+Sxvi 
information to intelli-
gence committees. 
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FY FY FY 
2007 2008 2009 Provision H.R. H.R. S.372 2082 5959 
Require audit of 
covert actions every 3 N § 423 § 421 years and report to 
Congress. 
Require extensive 
report on use of 
personal service con- N § 307 § 306 
tractors in Intelligence 
Community. 
N = no equivalent provision in this bill 
0 =administration opposed this provision 
S = administration supported this provision 
-- = administration silent on this provision 
FY 
0 2010 b::J er � p; 
H.R. r:n s P"' 
2701 p; 
§ 411 oxvii --
§ 328 oxviii --
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APPENDIX B 
INTELLIGENCE DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS PROPOSED 
DURING EITHER BUSH OR OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATIONS (BUT NOT BOTH) 
FY FY FY FY 
0 2007 2008 2009 2010 t:;d cr' Provision i= � H.R. H.R. H.R. Cfl s S . 372 µ 2082 5959 2701 � 
Non-covert action disclosure beyond chair & rankin� member: 
If full information is 
not given to the full 
committees, then, at § 304 N N N oxix least, notify each 
member of that fact & 
why. 
Deny funding for any 
intelligence activity, 
unless full committees 
have been informed of § 307 N N N oxx 
it, or have at least been 
notified that they were 
not informed. 
Deny 70% of funding 
for particular intelli-
gence program until 
executive branch "fully 
and currently" informs N § 328 N N axxi full intelligence com-
mittees regarding a 
S eptember 6, 2007 
Israeli military action 
against S yria. 
Disclose to the full 
intelligence committees N N § 502 N oxxii if chair & ranking 
member agree. 
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FY FY FY FY 
0 2007 2008 2009 2010 t:d cr' Provision i::: p:i H.R. H.R. H.R. r:n s S. 372 ::i-2082 5959 2701 p:i 
Other provisions: 
Report on "intelligence 
activities related to the 
overthrow of a N § 502 N N oxxiii democratically elected 
government" in 
previous 10 years. 
Disclose intelligence 
information to the 
Government 
Accountability Office N N N § 335 oxxiv 
in support of congres-
sional intelligence 
oversight. 
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NOTES FOR APPENDICES 
i. This provision also was found in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2006, S. 1803, 109th Cong. § 107 (2005); see also S. REP. No. 109-142 (2005). 
ii. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 (" [The provision] would foster political 
gamesmanship and elevate routine disagreements to the level of constitutional crises.") .  
iii. Section 313 of S. 372 would require disclosure of "all legal opinions" provided 
by the Department of Justice regarding the "meaning or application of the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 with respect to the detention and interrogation activities" 
undertaken by any element of the intelligence community. Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2007, S. 372, llOth Cong. § 313 (2007). 
iv. Section 326 of H.R. 2082 requires the executive branch to disclose to the 
congressional intelligence committee: "the legal justifications of any office of the 
Department of Justice about the meaning or application of the Detainee Treatment Act 
of 2005 or related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 with respect to the 
detention or interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the intelligence 
community."  Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2082, llOth 
Cong. § 326 (2007). 
v. This provision "includes no exception for applicable legal privileges . . . .  [and] 
rais[es] grave constitutional issues." FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 1. This is a "matter[] 
. . .  appropriately left to sensitive handling in the normal course between the intelligence 
committees and the executive branch and should not be the subject of detailed statutory 
reporting requirements." FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 2-3; see also INTELLIGENCE 
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008-VETO MESSAGE FROM THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. Doc. No. 110-100), 154 CONG. REC. Hl419-20 
(2008); FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 (" [Q]uestions concerning access to such 
information are best addressed through the customary practices and arrangements 
between the executive and legislative branches on such matters, rather than through the 
enactment of legislation."). 
vi. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 (" [T]his section would undermine long­
standing arrangements between Congress and the President regarding reporting of 
sensitive intelligence matters.") .  
vii. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 1 (" [This] section raises serious constitutional 
concerns by amending sections 501-503 of the National Security Act of 1947 in ways that 
would raise significant executive privilege concerns by purporting to require the 
disclosure of internal Executive branch legal .advice and deliberations. Administrations 
of both political parties have long recognized the importance of protecting the 
confidentiality of the Executive Branch's  legal advice and deliberations. If the final bill 
presented to the President contains this provision, the President 's senior advisors would 
recommend a veto. ") (emphasis in original). 
viii. See FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33. 
ix. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 ("These reporting requirements themselves 
may require broader dissemination of the very facts that require limited access."). 
x. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 ("These provisions establish an all-or-nothing 
approach to executive branch notification to the intelligence committees that could delay 
actions needed to meet urgent national security requirements and would discourage, 
rather than encourage, the sharing of extraordinarily sensitive information needed for 
effective legislative-executive relations with respect to the most sensitive intelligence 
matters. This provision, in practice, would seek to compel the disclosure to multiple 
additional persons of sensitive national security information as to which the President 
has determined that special protection must be provided."). 
xi. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 ("Such a provision is inconsistent with the 
statute that expressly authorizes limited notice to Congress in exceptional cases and 
would undermine the fundamental compact between the Congress and the President on 
reporting highly sensitive intelligence matters-an arrangement that for decades has 
336 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:313 
balanced congressional oversight responsibility with the need to protect intelligence 
information. Questions concerning access to such information are best addressed 
through the customary practices and arrangements, rather than through enactment of 
contradictory legislation."). 
xii. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 1 (" [This provision] undermines this 
fundamental compact between the Congress and the President as embodied in Title V of 
the National Security Act regarding the reporting of sensitive intelligence matters- an 
arrangement that for decades has balanced congressional oversight responsibilities with 
the President's responsibility to protect sensitive national security information."). 
xiii. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 1 ("The Administration has consistently 
opposed the creation of an IG/IC in prior bills.");  FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34, at 1 
("The existing inspectors general of the departments with elements in the IC, and the 
Central Intelligence Agency, are best suited to perform the necessary investigative, 
inspection, and audit functions. There is no need to spend additional taxpayer resources 
to provide for two inspectors general with competing jurisdiction over the same 
intelligence elements.");  FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 3 ("The existing IGs of all the 
IC elements are best suited to . performing the investigation, inspection, and audit 
functions, without the organizationally dysfunctional interference of an outside entity 
like the proposed new IG. This provision also is inconsistent with the preservation of the 
authority of heads of departments and agencies over their respective departments and 
agencies so carefully preserved by the chain of command provision in the IRTP A.") .  
xiv. The FY 2010 SAP stated that the Obama Administration "supports the 
important work undertaken by Inspectors General . . .  and would like to work with the 
Congress on the optimal approach and authorities for carrying out the important 
functions of Inspectors General in the context of the IC."  FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 
2. 
xv. FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 ("Other provisions . . .  purport to require the 
President to submit information that may be constitutionally protected from disclosure, 
including information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, national 
security, deliberative processes of the Executive, or performance of the Executive's 
constitutional duties. Questions concerning access to such information are best addressed 
through the customary practices and arrangements between the executive and legislative 
branches on such matters, rather than through the enactment of legislation."). It is not 
clear that this language refers to the whistleblower provision. It may refer to IC/IG 
provision, in general. 
xvi. FY 2010 SAP, supra note 33, at 2 ("Although the Administration supports 
section 406's expansion of the protections and limitations of the Intelligence Community 
Whistleblower Protection Act, the Administration is concerned that the bill as drafted 
could be understood to constrain the President's constitutional authority to review and, if 
appropriate, control disclosure of certain classified information. Administration officials 
are working closely with Senate and House staff to craft appropriate whistleblower 
enhancement protections for intelligence community whistleblowers through separate 
legislative vehicles, H.R. 1507 and S. 372, and urge that the whistleblower enhancement 
provision in this bill account for Administration proposals offered in those contexts to 
address constitutional and other concerns with the current formulation.") .  
xvii. FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34 (" [This provision] raise[s] constitutional concerns 
with regard to the President 's  exclusive authority to control access to national security 
information."); FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 ("This provision would interfere with 
the independent judgment of the CIA Inspector General or Director of the CIA as to 
what activities should be audited and when the audits should be conducted. Further, this 
provision conflicts with the President's authority to control the dissemination of 
classified information, provisions in the CIA Act concerning IG activities affecting vital 
national security interests, and long-standing arrangements between the Executive and 
Legislative branches regarding the transmittal of information about sensitive intelligence 
programs.") .  
xviii. FY 2009 SAP, supra note 34. The FY 2008 SAP also objected to this provision, 
but only because "there [was] insufficient time to prepare and coordinate the report by 
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the . . .  due date." FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34, at 3. 
xix. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 ("These reporting requirements themselves 
may require broader dissemination of the very facts that require limited access.") .  
xx. FY 2007 SAP, supra note 34,  at  2 ("These provisions establish an all-or-nothing 
approach to executive branch notification to the intelligence committees that could delay 
actions needed to meet urgent national security requirements and would discourage, 
rather than encourage, the sharing of extraordinarily sensitive information needed for 
effective legislative-executive relations with respect to the most sensitive intelligence 
matters. This provision, in practice, would seek to compel the disclosure to multiple 
additional persons of sensitive national security information as to which the President 
has determined that special protection must be provided.") .  
xxi. The FY 2008 SAP objected to this "attempt[] to use Congress' power of the 
purse to circumvent the authority of the Executive Branch to control access to 
extraordinarily sensitive information,'' and noted that " [i]n their conference report, the 
conferees stated that reporting to the full committee is required under" 50 U.S.C. § 413a, 
which requires reports of intelligence activities other than covert actions. FY 2008 SAP, 
supra note 34, at 2. "The Administration respectfully disagrees with this view and urges 
the Senate and the House to reject this provision." FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34, at 2. 
xxii. This provision "would undermine long-standing arrangements between 
Congress and the President regarding reporting of sensitive intelligence' matters." FY 
2009 SAP, supra note 34, at 2 (criticizing § 502 of H.R. 5959). 
xxiii. The FY 2008 SAP asserted that " [r]eporting on any such activities, if any, is 
governed by Title V of the National Security Act." FY 2008 SAP, supra note 34, at 3.  
xxiv. Letter from Peter R. Orszag, supra note 73. 
